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Customizing Employment Arbitration 
Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas† 
ABSTRACT: According to the dispute resolution literature, one advantage 
of arbitration over litigation is that arbitration enables the parties to 
customize their dispute-resolution procedures. For example, parties can 
choose the qualifications of the arbitrator(s), the governing procedural rules, 
the limitation period, recoverable damages, rules for discovery and the 
presentation of evidence and witnesses, and the specificity of required 
arbitrator findings. While some scholars have questioned whether parties to 
arbitration agreements frequently take advantage of this customization, 
there is little solid empirical information about the topic. 
 In this Article, we study the arbitration clauses found in a random 
sample of 910 Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) employment contracts 
entered into during the time period from 1995 to 2005 to determine how 
much customization actually takes place. We find only a small number of 
instances where fine-grained customization has occurred. Parties pay very 
little attention to customizing arbitral proceedings in these employment 
contracts although there is a significant increase in the practice over time. 
We find this result surprising given that CEO contracts are heavily 
negotiated documents. 
 Unexpectedly, we find that about half of the arbitration clauses in our 
contracts carve out a subset of potential claims or types of relief by reserving 
a right for the parties to seek such relief or file such claims in court. This 
phenomenon of customizing the circumstances under which parties will use 
arbitration has received almost no attention in the academic literature to 
date. In particular, we find that the types of claims carved out for court 
resolution are those involving a firm’s efforts to protect the value of its 
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information, reputation, and innovation. CEOs and companies in the 
information technology business are not significantly more likely to carve out 
such claims, and the use of these carveouts is increasing over time, 
suggesting that such carveouts are increasingly valuable to all firms. 
Unfortunately, California court regulation of arbitration clauses in 
employment contracts has significantly dampened the use of carveouts in 
contracts between CEOs and their firms located in California. Our data 
suggest that court efforts to protect employees by scrutinizing the specific 
carveouts we observe is both unnecessary and destructive. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration has become an increasingly popular form of dispute 
resolution. Today, it is routine for businesses, consumers, and employees to 
resort to arbitration rather than courts when they seek redress.1 This trend 
has been particularly pronounced in the United States, where the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)2 to contain a very 
strong pro-arbitration policy.3 Parties can agree to arbitrate virtually any 
claim, including claims arising under the federal securities acts, patent law, 
antitrust, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), and employment discrimination and other civil rights acts.4 
According to Supreme Court precedent, the broad respect for agreements 
to arbitrate applies both when they are negotiated between the parties and 
when they appear in contracts of adhesion, including consumer5 and 
employment contracts.6 Arbitration clauses are even upheld where the clear 
purpose of arbitration is to circumvent procedural mechanisms like class 
actions, designed to ensure that such claims will be brought in the first 
place.7 With relatively limited exception, the Court has uniformly struck 
down state regulations that interfere with arbitration under the FAA.8 
Arbitration is thought to be popular for many reasons, including that it 
can be customized to suit the desires of the parties.9 Scholars have noted 
that parties often use arbitration clauses to select a specific arbitration 
association, a particular location for the proceedings, and an off-the-rack set 
of governing rules.10 In addition, parties can specify the number of 
arbitrators who will decide their case(s),11 qualifications of their 
 
 1. See infra Part II.B. 
 2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. See infra notes 78–87 and accompanying text. 
 5. The Supreme Court has been particularly active this term in ensuring the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., 
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (nursing home care agreements); 
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (consumer credit card contracts). 
 6. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (employment 
discrimination claims). 
 7. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that 
California law prohibiting many class waiver clauses in arbitration agreements was preempted 
by the FAA). 
 8. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 9. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 444 (2011) (noting 
that federal arbitration law provides parties with an arbitral option that they can fill with 
customized procedures). 
 10. See, e.g., 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 619 (2009) 
(describing the material terms of an arbitration agreement as “number of, identity of and 
means of selecting arbitrators, arbitral seat, scope of agreement, institutional rules, [and] 
choice of law”). 
 11. Id. 
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arbitrator(s),12 and the governing procedures for choosing the decision 
maker(s).13 The parties can further specify the mode and conduct of arbitral 
proceedings, including the relevant rules of discovery14 and of evidence.15 
Furthermore, the parties can state whether they wish the arbitrator’s 
findings to contain the arbitrator’s reasoning,16 and they can choose a 
purely private form of law to guide the substantive outcome.17 
While the possibilities for customization seem limitless,18 there has been 
little work on understanding whether the parties actually do customize their 
arbitration clauses in this manner.19 What types of customization are 
common for arbitration agreements, and what types are more likely the 
products of creative but fanciful thinking by law professors?20 
In this Article, we explore these questions using a hand-coded, 
randomly selected sample of 910 CEO employment contracts at S&P 1500 
public companies. CEO employment contracts are particularly useful for our 
 
 12. Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving 
Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
329, 334 (1997). 
 13. BORN, supra note 10, at 176–77. 
 14. Anthony J. Diana et al., Electronic Discovery in Specific Areas of Practice, in ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY DESKBOOK 2012, at 299, 234 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 
No. 35302, 2012). 
 15. 1999 IBA Working Party & 2010 IBA Rules of Evidence Review Subcomm., Commentary 
on the Revised Text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, 5 DISP. 
RESOL. INT’L 45, 46 (2011). 
 16. Alan Scott Rau, On Integrity in Private Judging, 14 ARB. INT’L 115, 146–50 (1998). 
 17. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (explaining how cotton 
industry uses arbitration where privately drafted contract rules are applied). 
 18. They are not actually limitless. For example, parties to arbitration agreements 
governed by the FAA may not contract to alter the applicable standard of review of arbitral 
awards, at least not in federal courts. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 
(2008). 
 19. Existent empirical evidence includes one study of fifty-two arbitration clauses found in 
a wide variety of consumer contracts, Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To 
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, and one study of twenty standard-form franchise 
agreements, Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1103 (2011) (presenting results of former study that indicated an increasing trend toward 
the use of several customized terms in franchise agreements). In addition, there is at least one 
study of the use of class waivers in consumer contracts. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s 
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008).  
 20. In some law review articles, the author counsels businesses to pay more attention to 
their customization options, which suggests a belief that customization is at least suboptimally 
infrequent. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New 
Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383 (2009); Eileen B. Vernon, Arbitration in the 
Energy/Minerals Field: Customizing the Clause, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 50 (2001) (advocating updated 
customization of arbitration clauses used by environmental, energy, and natural-resource 
companies). 
        
2012] CUSTOMIZING EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 137 
inquiry because they are heavily negotiated documents entered into by 
sophisticated parties. Consistent with our earlier research, we find that the 
use of arbitration provisions is increasing over time, but that beyond a few 
basic decisions about which arbitration associations to use, whether to 
employ those associations’ arbitration rules, and to a much lesser extent, 
how to divide the costs of the proceeding, these parties and their attorneys 
rarely focus on customizing arbitration provisions. In other words, despite 
the robust academic literature on the subject, real-world customization is 
largely absent, although we find some evidence that it is slowly increasing 
over time. 
We are surprised to find strong evidence of a very different form of 
customization: carving out certain types of litigable claims from otherwise 
broad agreements to arbitrate. These litigation carveouts have received scant 
attention in the arbitration literature.21 In fact, most of the arbitration 
literature assumes that parties face a binary choice between courts and 
arbitration for the resolution of all of their disputes. But in the context of 
CEO employment agreements, we find it is commonplace for the parties to 
draft provisions generally requiring arbitration but at the same time 
reserving a right for the parties to go to court under some defined 
circumstances. Effectively, these parties are customizing the border between 
courts and arbitration for specific types of claims. We believe that the 
carveouts studied in this paper might be common in other types of contracts 
as well,22 making them an important topic for future research. 
More broadly, our study of CEO employment contracts provides a 
unique opportunity to revisit arguments about some common practices 
related to arbitration between employers and employees. Employment 
arbitration is controversial in the United States.23 Although employment 
 
 21. To our knowledge, only Christopher Drahozal has empirically studied carveouts from 
arbitration, and carveouts typically play only a very minor role in his studies. See, e.g., 
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 [hereinafter 
Drahozal, Unfair Arbitration Clauses]; Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a 
Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71 (2008). Drahozal and Stephen Ware have both 
addressed the topic of carveouts in nonempirical articles. Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual 
Agreements To Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537, 552–55 (2002); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of 
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 98–100. 
 22. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Carveouts and the Choice Between Courts and Arbitration 
(draft manuscript on file with authors) (studying carveouts in different types of contracts and 
involving parties from different countries to discern circumstances under which parties 
affirmatively demand courts). 
 23. Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration Myths, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 663, 665 (2008); 
Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-compete Covenants 
as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379 (2006); Jyotin Hamid & Emily J. 
Mathieu, The Arbitration Fairness Act: Performing Surgery with a Hatchet Instead of a Scalpel?, 74 ALB. 
L. REV. 769, 769 (2011); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements To Waive or To Arbitrate Legal Claims: An 
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 248 (2000); David S. Ruder, Securities Arbitration in 
the Public Interest: The Role of Punitive Damages, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 69, 72 n.23 (1997); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
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arbitration promises a quicker, cheaper, and less adversary means for 
employees to resolve their disputes with employers, critics charge that the 
arbitration agreements are contracts of adhesion, that the employment 
arbitration system is rigged in favor of employers, and that employers utilize 
arbitration to effectively deprive employees of their rights.24 
Given the concerns about the fairness of employment arbitration, 
governments and arbitration associations have responded in several 
different ways.25 Particularly relevant to this Article, many U.S. state courts 
use the contract law doctrine of unconscionability to scrutinize the terms of 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts for fundamental fairness. In the 
context of arbitration carveouts, a number of U.S. courts will strike an 
arbitration clause as unconscionable if it forces only the employee to 
arbitrate her claims, while still preserving the employer’s right to enforce its 
rights in court.26 In California, state courts have struck down arbitration 
clauses that on their face require both parties to bring their claims to 
arbitration but then carve out from arbitration claims that are likely to be 
brought by the employer.27 Given that California is often a leader in state 
efforts to regulate unfair arbitration provisions, its stance on this issue could 
well spread to other states. 
Our CEO employment contracts provide a window into the terms of 
employment agreements where both parties have significant bargaining 
power and actively negotiate their agreements with the assistance of 
counsel.28 These agreements are admittedly very different from the adhesion 
contracts typically found in employment, but the very fact that our contracts 
are negotiated can provide some indication of whether sophisticated 
employees think arbitration disserves their interests. In our contracts, the 
terms that survive mutual negotiation likely are not the product of employer 
overreaching, but rather reflect the strong economic desire of one of the 
parties to obtain a legal right, even if it means that the party must provide 
extra compensation, or alternate concessions, in order to obtain the right. 
This suggests that if we find that the parties commonly agree to certain 
arbitration provisions, these provisions must be the result of an efficient 
 
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 670 (1996); Adriaan Lanni, Case Note, Protecting Public Rights 
in Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J. 1157, 1161 n.25 (1998). 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. See infra Part II.C. 
 26. See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. As we discuss below, when courts find 
unconscionable the types of carveouts observed in our contracts, the arbitration clause is struck 
in its entirety and employers find themselves unable to rely on arbitration for the resolution of 
any claims.  
 28. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 236–39 (2006) 
(describing prevalent contracting behavior among CEOs and their firms’ boards). 
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bargain between them.29 Such findings may have implications for the 
enforceability of similar provisions in other employment contracts; if even 
sophisticated employees are comfortable accepting these terms, then 
perhaps courts should reconsider their hostility to such contract clauses. 
Along these lines, our first important finding is that about half of the CEO 
employment agreements provide for the arbitration of disputes, and that the 
use of arbitration clauses is increasing significantly over time. Our finding 
suggests that the use of arbitration in the context of employment provides 
significant perceived legitimate benefit to one or both parties, at least for 
sophisticated parties. 
Our second finding relevant to state regulation of arbitration clauses is 
that almost half of the contracts with arbitration clauses carve out the very 
types of disputes that would cause the California courts to strike 
employment arbitration clauses. These carveouts include disputes pertaining 
to the confidentiality, noncompete, nonsolicitation, and nondisparagement 
clauses of the employment agreement. Collectively, these clauses appear to 
be designed to enable the firm to protect the value of its information, 
reputation, and innovation. Although we believe that employment 
arbitration provisions probably should be scrutinized by courts to ensure 
their fundamental fairness, it appears that these carveouts serve a legitimate 
economic function for the company and do not simply represent 
overreaching in a one-sided contract of adhesion. Court scrutiny of these 
carveouts in employment contracts, especially CEO and top management 
contracts, therefore seems misplaced. 
Our study also provides evidence that the California court decisions 
have significantly influenced the drafting of arbitration agreements by firms 
primarily located in California. Using multivariate regression analysis, we 
find that California firms were significantly more likely than non-California 
firms to contract for preliminary relief in courts (a carveout permitted by 
California courts), but significantly less likely to carve out other, more 
nuanced, claims for resolution by courts (carveouts considered suspect in 
California courts). For many non-California firms, court resolution of the 
latter types of claims, such as those involving restrictions on disclosing 
confidential firm information or soliciting key employees, appears to enable 
firms to better protect themselves and their shareholders. Those benefits are 
denied to firms primarily located in California. In the end, California 
doctrine provides no additional legitimate benefit to employees while 
inflicting harm on local firms. 
We proceed as follows. Part II frames our research questions and 
provides a review of the existing academic literature and governing law on 
 
 29. Specifically, the bargain must be Kaldor-Hicks efficient in that one of the parties is 
willing to negotiate away other possible advantages in order to include the carveout in the 
agreement. 
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arbitration agreements and their contents. In Part III we describe our CEO 
employment contracts sample and provide a univariate analysis of its 
contents. Part IV provides a multivariate analysis of the determinants of the 
use of arbitration provisions, customization, and carveouts. Part V discusses 
the implications of our study for court treatment of arbitration carveouts 
and for future scholarship. 
II. A BRIEF ARBITRATION PRIMER 
To set the stage for our research questions, in Subpart A we briefly 
describe the growth of arbitration and common factors that can lead 
contracting parties to opt for arbitration of disputes. Subpart B then 
discusses the current state of arbitration law as it relates to court regulation 
of parties’ agreements to arbitrate, and it addresses the application of the 
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion. 
Subpart C concludes by describing special court concerns regarding 
employment arbitration. 
A. CHOOSING TO ARBITRATE 
For many contracting parties, arbitration has become an increasingly 
popular form of dispute resolution. The typical means of choosing 
arbitration is for the contracting parties to specify in their agreement that 
any future disputes will be subject to binding arbitration.30 Survey data31 and 
scholars’ claims32 both indicate an increasing use of arbitration clauses in 
international commerce. Domestically, the past few decades apparently have 
witnessed an increased use of arbitration clauses in a wide variety of 
agreements, including securities industry brokerage account contracts,33 
employment contracts,34 consumer contracts,35 and even nursing home care 
agreements.36 
 
 30. Parties can instead contract for nonbinding arbitration, in which case the arbitrator’s 
decision is advisory only. Alternatively, after a dispute arises, the parties can enter into an 
agreement to resolve the claim through arbitration. This Article ignores such arbitration 
agreements and focuses almost exclusively on pre-dispute agreements to subject disputes to 
binding arbitration.  
 31. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 10, at 70; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2, 5 (2008), available at http://www.pwc. 
co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/pwc-international-arbitration-2008.pdf.  
 32. BORN, supra note 10, at 70; see also CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. 
NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 59 (2005) (finding that 88% of sample of international joint venture agreements 
contained arbitration clauses). 
 33. See David J. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators—Not the Three Monkeys, 30 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 1, 38 (2004) (noting that use of arbitration clauses in securities industry, 
employment, and consumer contracts is now “standard,” and that in general, the use and public 
acceptance of such clauses is “pervasive”). 
 34. Id.; see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2011) (commenting on dramatic 
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The popularity of arbitration has also led to a dramatic rise in the 
reported use of arbitration association services. For example, the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration 
has had a twenty-fold increase in filed cases between 1956 and 2007.37 
Between 1980 and 2007, the number of international arbitrations filed with 
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) increased more than six-
fold.38 The caseload of eleven arbitral institutions located throughout the 
world increased from a total of 1392 filings in 1993 to 3235 filings in 
2007,39 and to 3685 in 2010.40 Between 1997 and 2001, the number of 
employment arbitrations filed with the AAA rose by 60%;41 today, an 
estimated one-third of nonunion employees are subject to arbitration 
clauses for their employment-related disputes.42 Between 2003 and the first 
quarter of 2012, 61,702 consumer arbitration cases were concluded under 
the auspices of the AAA.43 And, as noted by Gary Born, “the use of 
arbitration as a means of resolving new (previously ‘un-arbitrated’) 
categories of disputes, including class actions, bilateral investment treaty 
claims and human rights claims, attests to its enduring and increasing 
popularity.”44 
Arbitration can provide a number of advantages for contracting parties. 
In the context of cross-border transactions, for example, arbitration can 
provide a neutral forum,45 and the decisions rendered by arbitrators are 
more easily enforced across borders than are court judgments.46 Moreover, 
 
growth in employment arbitration and citing estimate that for at least one third of nonunion 
employees, disputes must be resolved in arbitration). 
 35. Branson, supra note 33, at 38; Laura K. Bailey, Note, The Demise of Arbitration Agreements 
in Long-Term Care Contracts, 75 MO. L. REV. 181, 181 (2010). 
 36. Bailey, supra note 35, at 181. 
 37. BORN, supra note 10, at 69. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Statistics: Case Statistics - 2010, H.K. INT’L ARB. CTR., http://www.hkiac.org/index.php/ 
en/hkiac-statistics/case-statistics (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). 
 41. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An 
Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 44 (2004). 
 42. Colvin, supra note 34, at 2. 
 43. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION STATISTICS, available at http://www. 
adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_020811 (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
 44. BORN, supra note 10, at 70 (footnotes omitted). 
 45. See id. at 2 (stating that international commercial arbitration successfully provides a 
“fair, neutral, expert and efficient means of resolving difficult and contentious transnational 
problems”). 
 46. This difference is due to the fact that more than 140 nations are parties to the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which 
obligates each nation to enforce arbitral awards regardless of where they are rendered. 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ 
UNTS/Volume%20330/v330.pdf; see also Status of Convention on the Recognition and 
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arbitration is a much more heterogeneous phenomenon than is court 
determination, and often the parties are permitted to contract over the 
particular features of arbitration. This freedom enables the parties to 
customize the arbitration process to suit their needs.47 
For example, the parties can ensure that the dispute is heard by 
decision makers with industry experience who will be familiar with relevant 
custom and trade usage.48 In addition, arbitration can be (although often is 
not) streamlined to provide relatively cheap and speedy resolution of 
claims,49 and it can enable the parties to avoid juries,50 tailor the parties’ 
rights to engage in discovery,51 eliminate punitive damage awards,52 shift fees 
 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http:// 
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (listing the countries that are participants to the agreement). In 
contrast, there is no widespread international convention that forces nations to enforce one 
another’s court judgments. A recently concluded Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements would require nations to enforce court judgments rendered in a court designated 
in a contractual choice-of-court clause. Hague Convention on Court of Choice Agreements, 
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. However, this Convention has not yet come into force, and 
some wonder whether it will ever do so. See Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18 
SW. J. INT’L L. 629 (2012).  
 47. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 5 (2007), available at http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/si.asp? 
id=4125 (“The parties are free to customize and refine the basic arbitration procedures to meet 
their particular needs.”). 
 48. ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 5 (3d ed. 2006). 
 49. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 16, 32 (providing sample arbitration 
clauses designed to help ensure quick dispute resolution). On the question of whether 
arbitration is in fact faster and cheaper than litigation, see RAU ET AL., supra note 48, at 5 
(arguing that it is); Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 579 
(2008) (discussing the cost savings arbitration provides); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory 
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1268 & n.53 (2009) (assuming, for the 
purposes of the author’s analysis, that “process costs are, on the whole, less in arbitration than 
litigation,” with the caveat that the author suspects that the “cost savings in arbitration are often 
exaggerated”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 460 
(1988) (lawyer surveys indicate that arbitration tends to be faster and cheaper than litigation). 
But see W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 29–36 
(3d ed. 2000) (recognizing that some participating in arbitration governed by the International 
Chamber of Commerce have criticized the process for being too costly); Christian A. Atwood, 
Creative Approaches To Financing Company M&A in a Brave New (Unlevered) World, in DEALING WITH 
M&A FINANCING AND RISK IN A CHANGING MARKET 25, 33 (2010) (providing that author’s 
personal experience suggests that arbitration is no faster or cheaper than litigation); 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008) (stating that the empirical evidence is too limited to draw 
definitive conclusion about relative costs of arbitration and litigation). 
 50. Randall Thomas, Erin O’Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment 
Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959, 972 (2010). 
 51. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 30–31 (providing sample clauses to address 
document discovery and the taking of depositions). 
 52. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 94 (2009). 
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and costs amongst the parties,53 help ensure confidentiality regarding the 
details of the dispute,54 provide a right to appeal awards to an appellate 
panel,55 and provide relative certainty about the governing law of the 
contract.56 In general, arbitrators possess the authority provided to them by 
the association chosen for arbitration, which typically includes the powers 
that a judge would possess, but the parties’ agreement can further customize 
the exercise of an arbitrator’s authority.57 
There is little empirical evidence regarding the degree to which 
contracting parties actually do customize their arbitration clauses. 
Christopher Drahozal’s studies of franchise contracts and (along with Peter 
B. Rutledge) consumer credit card agreements indicate that companies 
often carefully address several possible features of arbitration, but they also 
tend to remain silent regarding several possible issues that could be 
addressed. Regarding franchise contracts, only about 10% of the arbitration 
clauses addressed the arbitration award’s standard of review, and only about 
20% of the contracts addressed the governing rules for discovery, but 
approximately 96% of the contracts specified the location of the arbitration 
proceeding.58 By 2007, approximately 60% of franchise contract arbitration 
provisions specified the number of arbitrators, 70% provided time limits for 
filing claims, 85% restricted the award of punitive damages, 85% also 
addressed the allocation of the costs of arbitration, and almost 90% 
addressed the availability of class arbitration.59 
In contrast, a sample of 293 standard-form credit card agreements 
indicated that the drafting patterns overlapped with, but were also somewhat 
distinct from, the franchise agreements. The Rutledge and Drahozal study 
found that 94% of arbitration clauses addressed the number of arbitrators, 
but only 42% of issuers addressed the allocation of the costs of arbitration.60 
 
 53. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 35 (providing sample clauses to address 
allocation of attorneys’ fees). Our CEO employment contracts commonly provide cost-
allocation provisions in the arbitration clause. See infra Table 4. 
 54. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 36 (providing sample clauses requiring the 
parties to maintain confidentiality regarding the details of the dispute). 
 55. Id. at 37 (providing sample language that would create a right of appeal in 
arbitration). 
 56. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 52, at 87–88. Arbitration-association rules typically 
require the arbitrator to apply the law chosen by the parties, in contrast to courts, which tend to 
apply a discretionary standard to the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses. Id. 
 57. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 47, at 5 (“If the parties agree on a procedure that 
conflicts with otherwise applicable AAA rules, the AAA will almost always respect the wishes of 
the parties.”); id. at 32–33 (providing sample provisions for arbitration agreements specifying 
or limiting remedies that arbitrators can award); id. at 36 (providing sample provisions 
requiring arbitrators to issue a reasoned award). 
 58. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 21, at 102–14. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, BYU L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 31, 33), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101399. 
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Nearly half of these contracts addressed party rights to challenge the award 
in front of an arbitral appeals panel, but only about 2% stated that the 
parties had an obligation to keep the details of any dispute confidential, only 
2% provided for limits in discovery, and only 4% provided time limits for 
filing claims. The very small incidence of these latter provisions is likely due 
to the fact that some arbitration associations will not hear consumer 
arbitrations unless they satisfy minimum standards of fairness to the 
consumer,61 and some courts will strike arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts if they appear to be unfairly one-sided.62 
Although growing in popularity, arbitration is not well suited for all 
contracting parties. For example, when at least one party wishes to rely on 
the certainty of the legal principles that will be applied to the case,63 or 
forecasts a potential need for assistance to foreclose on property,64 courts 
may be preferred. In addition, because of the very limited ability to obtain 
judicial review of arbitral awards,65 a company concerned about very large 
judgments relative to the value of the company might prefer the appeals 
process available in courts.66 In their study of material contracts filed with 
the SEC, Eisenberg and Miller found very low rates of the use of arbitration 
clauses in several types of high-level business contracts where applicable 
legal rules are relatively well developed.67 They found virtually no use of 
arbitration clauses in trust agreements, pooling and service agreements, and 
 
 61. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998), available at 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014. 
 62. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 60. 
 63. See Hylton, supra note 23, at 231. 
 64. See, e.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 480–82 
(2010) (noting lack of arbitration clauses in secured mortgage agreements, but providing no 
satisfactory explanation for their absence). 
 65. The grounds for modifying or vacating an arbitral award pursuant to an agreement 
covered by the FAA are found in section 10 of that statute and include corruption, fraud or 
undue means, evident partiality, arbitrator misconduct, or excess use of arbitral authority. 9 
U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see also Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(“[I]n reviewing arbitral awards, a district or appellate court is limited to determining ‘whether 
the arbitrators did the job they were told to do—not whether they did it well, or correctly, or 
reasonably, but simply whether they did it.’” (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac 
R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 1992))); Eljer Mfg., Inc. 
v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1253–54 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Errors in the arbitrator’s 
interpretation of law or findings of fact do not merit reversal under this standard. Nor does an 
insufficiency of evidence supporting the decision permit us to disturb the arbitrator’s order.” 
(internal citations omitted)); Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“It is well-settled that a court’s power to vacate an arbitration award must be extremely 
limited . . . .”). 
 66. Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
905, 908 (2010). 
 67. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study 
of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 
350 (2007). 
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bond indentures, and only about 5% use of arbitration clauses in service 
agreements, about 12% use for securities purchases, and 19% use in merger 
agreements.68 
We studied the use of arbitration clauses in the context of CEO 
employment contracts to determine how commonly these parties choose to 
have their disputes arbitrated and to glean some indication of whether the 
use of arbitration clauses in these contracts is growing over time. We were 
interested in learning about whether the use of arbitration clauses depends 
on either the industry type or the primary location of the firm. Regarding 
the specific details of arbitration agreements, we wanted to observe the 
extent to which arbitration agreements are customized in CEO employment 
contracts, and we sought a determination of what factors might influence 
this customization. 
We also sought to determine the extent to which individually negotiated 
contracts respond to the desirability of otherwise applicable state laws. For 
example, one finding of our study is that contracts involving firms primarily 
located in California are more likely to include an arbitration clause. This 
increased use might well result from the fact that California courts will not 
provide a firm with some of the legal protections that it seeks, including 
enforcement of noncompete provisions in an employment contract.69 The 
increased use of arbitration clauses by California firms is particularly 
noteworthy given that, as discussed below, California courts are especially 
hostile to arbitration clauses in employment contracts. This hostility might, 
in other circumstances, lead firms to use arbitration clauses less rather than 
more often. 
B. COURT REGULATION OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE 
When parties do enter into a written agreement to arbitrate their 
disputes, a strong federal pro-arbitration policy ensures that their choice will 
be respected in most cases. In 1925, Congress passed the FAA,70 which 
provides for the enforcement of both arbitration clauses and arbitration 
awards found in contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”71 
The FAA instructs courts to stay any pending court proceeding and to 
issue an order to compel arbitration if one of the parties seeks to enforce an 
arbitration agreement.72 Congress amended the FAA to add Chapter 273 
after the United States joined the New York Convention, which requires 
 
 68. Id. at 351. 
 69. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607–09 (1999). 
 70. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006). 
 71. Id. § 2. 
 72. Id. §§ 3–4. 
 73. Id. §§ 201–08. 
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member nations to enforce arbitration agreements and awards.74 Chapter 2 
provides protections to contracting parties who enter into commercial 
agreements with a “reasonable relationship” to “one or more foreign 
states.”75 The Supreme Court has held that the FAA binds state as well as 
federal courts.76 And for international commercial relationships, Chapter 2 
provides an automatic right to the defendant to remove a case to federal 
court for enforcement of the arbitration agreement or award.77 
In order for the arbitration agreement to be enforced, however, the 
dispute must involve a subject matter that is capable of resolution by 
arbitration.78 It is not uncommon for the governments of other nations to 
determine that in order to protect certain important public rights or the 
interests of third parties, some claims are not referable to arbitration.79 
Elsewhere, common forms of nonarbitrable subject matter include criminal 
offenses, consumer employment disputes, and claims involving intellectual 
property and domestic relations.80 
In the United States, however, the Supreme Court has progressively 
limited the circumstances under which a court can determine that a dispute 
is nonarbitrable, in both the international and domestic contexts. For 
example, the Supreme Court has determined that federal securities act 
claims can be arbitrated, notwithstanding language in the federal statutes 
that forbids parties to waive any of their statutory rights.81 The Court has 
reasoned that arbitration is merely a venue for dispute resolution and does 
not necessarily entail a diminution of legal protection.82 In addition, 
antitrust claims,83 RICO claims,84 and claims under the Age Discrimination 
 
 74. See supra note 46. 
 75. 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 76. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 77. 9 U.S.C. § 205. Suits involving domestic contracts containing arbitration agreements 
are removable to federal court only if they involve an independent federal question or if the 
case satisfies the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. 
 78. See BORN, supra note 10, at 767 (“Both international arbitration conventions and 
national law provide that agreements to arbitrate such ‘non-arbitrable’ matters need not 
necessarily be given effect and that arbitral awards concerning such matters need not 
necessarily be recognized.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 79. Id. at 768. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
417 U.S. 506, 514–17 (1974). 
 82. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481. 
 83. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The 
holding in Mitsubishi was confined to international agreements, but the lower courts have 
uniformly held that antitrust claims arising under domestic contracts can also be arbitrated. See 
BORN, supra note 10, at 785 n.1137, 793 n.1170 (citing several cases). 
 84. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242. 
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and Employment Act85 are all arbitrable. More generally, the Court has 
stated that “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an 
arbitration agreement.”86 In fact, earlier this year in a case involving federal 
consumer credit card regulations, the Supreme Court suggested that federal 
law claims should be deemed arbitrable unless Congress specifically provides 
otherwise.87 
The Supreme Court has similarly curtailed state power to limit the pro-
arbitration policy embedded in the FAA, finding that state laws that deem 
claims nonarbitrable are preempted.88 Furthermore, state procedural laws 
designed to make sure that parties to adhesion contracts have notice that 
the agreement is subject to arbitration are preempted under the FAA.89 
State laws that apply only to arbitration agreements are not permitted.90 And 
state laws that hinder the purposes and objectives of the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy apparently are also preempted, even if they are not 
directed solely at arbitration.91 
The only situation under which a court can refuse to enforce an 
arbitration clause in an agreement governed by the FAA is when, under § 2 
of the FAA, the court finds “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”92 Grounds for refusing to enforce such 
arbitration agreements must therefore derive from generally applicable 
contract doctrines, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.93 
Unconscionability is a creature of state law, so its contours vary by 
jurisdiction. As a general matter, however, contract provisions can be struck 
down in whole or in part if the agreement is infected with elements of both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability such that it appears to the 
court that enforcing the contract as written would be fundamentally unfair.94 
 
 85. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27, 35 (1991). 
 86. Id. at 26. 
 87. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668–73 (2012). 
 88. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (striking 
state prohibition on arbitration of wrongful death claims brought against nursing homes); 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56, 58 (1995) (striking state law 
that disenabled arbitration of claims involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 
483, 491 (1987) (holding that the California Labor Law, which provided that wage collection 
actions were nonarbitrable, is preempted by the FAA); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 
10 (1984) (striking law that prohibited arbitration of state financial investment statute claims). 
 89. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (striking Montana statute that 
required that contracts with arbitration clauses provide conspicuous notice of the clause on the 
first page of the contract). 
 90. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50, 356 (2008) (striking state regulation 
empowering state commission to decide scope of arbitration); Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681. 
 91. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 92. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 93. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
 94. See generally GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M. LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND 
LITIGATION 309–10 (2d ed. 2008). 
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Procedural unconscionability is present when a party lacks a meaningful 
choice or there is some defect in the bargaining process that causes a court 
to question the true assent of the party to the terms of the contract.95 
Substantive unconscionability is present when the terms of the bargain 
unreasonably favor one party.96 Some courts have determined that contracts 
of adhesion, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to one of the parties, carry 
with them some procedural unconscionability and that terms in contracts of 
adhesion can be struck down if they appear to be oppressive or unfairly one-
sided.97 
Courts have used the unconscionability doctrine in the context of 
contracts of adhesion, including both consumer and employment contracts, 
to ensure that the arbitration clause does not effectively deprive the 
nondrafting party of her ability to vindicate her claims.98 For example, 
arbitration clauses that force a party to an adhesion contract to travel long 
distances or otherwise incur prohibitively expensive costs in order to 
arbitrate claims can be struck down as unconscionable.99 In addition, 
arbitration clauses may be deemed unconscionable when coupled with a 
limitation of the remedies available to consumers.100 Courts will scrutinize 
individual arbitration agreements for a determination of whether the 
process for choosing arbitrators appears to be designed to produce non-
neutral decision makers.101 If an arbitration clause provides only one party 
special procedural advantages in arbitration, the clause can likewise be 
deemed unconscionable. These last two features were present in the 
arbitration clause used by Hooters of America, Inc. during the 1990s.102 
Hooters created a list of “acceptable arbitrators” from which the parties 
would choose, and it could modify that list at any time. Moreover, under the 
arbitration provision, the employee was required to provide the employer 
with notice of the claims as well as details of the claims and was thereafter 
forbidden to raise additional claims later, but these rules did not apply to 
 
 95. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 570 (5th 
ed. 2003). 
 96. Id. at 568, 570. 
 97. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003); Flores v. 
Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381–82 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 98. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (striking 
requirement that consumer proceed to arbitration at International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”) because the expenses associated with filing a claim with the ICC rendered the chosen 
forum financially prohibitive). 
 99. Cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (recognizing these 
grounds for invalidating an arbitration agreement but placing the burden of proof on the party 
seeking to invalidate the clause).  
 100. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 319 
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 101. Hayes v. County Bank, 713 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 2000). 
 102. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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the employer. In addition, the employee was required to provide the 
employer with a list of witnesses and a summary of facts known about each, 
but the employer was subject to no corresponding duty. Finally, the 
employer—but not the employee—was provided with rights to appeal the 
arbitrator’s decision to a court. Because the arbitration clause had features 
that increased the likelihood that the employer would prevail, it was struck 
down as “egregiously unfair.”103 
C. AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
A number of factors have combined to cause some courts to use 
whatever tools they may to carefully scrutinize agreements to arbitrate 
employment disputes. First, states have little ability to enact laws designed to 
prevent employers from using adhesion contracts to force employees to 
arbitrate their employment disputes. The Supreme Court has determined 
that even statutory nondiscrimination suits are subject to arbitration, and 
state laws directed at preserving particular state employment claims for 
courts are preempted by the FAA.104 Second, employment arbitration is on 
the rise, raising concerns about the employers’ motivations for inserting 
these clauses into employment contracts.105 For example, some charge that 
arbitration clauses are drafted to effectively deprive employees of their 
rights.106 Along the same lines, some scholars object to the effective 
privatization of civil rights and other discrimination claims in arbitration.107 
In short, the claim is that employers prefer arbitration because, relative to 
employees, they fare better in arbitration than in litigation. 
The available empirical evidence on case win rates does not provide 
clear guidance on the matter. Two studies conducted in the 1990s showed 
higher employee win rates in arbitration than in litigation.108 In contrast, a 
recent study comparing outcomes of employment disputes in litigation and 
arbitration show that employee win rates tend to be higher in litigation.109 
Another study found that results for high-wage employees differ significantly 
from results for low-wage employees. High-wage employees appear to fare as 
well in arbitration as in courts. Low-wage employees fare relatively worse 
than their higher paid counterparts in arbitration, but they seem to be 
 
 103. Id. at 938. 
 104. See supra Part II.B. 
 105. See supra Part I. 
 106. David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory Protection of 
Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
561 (1997).  
 107. Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in 
the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment 
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998).  
 108. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, DISP. RESOL. J. 
Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40; Maltby, supra note 107. 
 109. Colvin, supra note 34, at 6. 
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practically shut out of courts due to the fact that their lower-value claims fail 
to attract counsel.110 Of course, even if we had reliable information on 
relative employee win rates in arbitration and litigation, the two categories 
of cases are subject to very different selection pressures, making the 
comparison not terribly useful.111 Nonetheless, concerns about the 
motivations behind the employer’s unilateral choice persist. 
When employees win, empirical studies show that overall the amounts 
that they recover are substantially higher in litigation than in arbitration.112 
One study found that although this difference existed for lower wage 
employees, there was no statistically significant difference in mean or 
median awards in arbitration and at trial for higher wage employees.113 Here 
too, selection effects cause concern over the meaning of any difference. 
Still other critics of employment arbitration focus on a potential repeat-
player effect. Employers with multiple cases in front of the same arbitration 
association fare better in arbitration than do employers that do not arbitrate 
multiple cases.114 Moreover, employers that arbitrate multiple cases with the 
same arbitrator tend to fare better, on average, than employers that arbitrate 
multiple cases with different arbitrators.115 The concern is that when 
employers effectively pick the arbitration association and have greater 
knowledge about potential arbitrators, they can produce results biased in 
their favor, especially if arbitrators want to be selected again in the future.116 
Defenders of employment arbitration counter that these concerns are 
overblown and that arbitration can provide a quick, informal, and low-cost 
means for employees to bring their employment claims.117 Empirical 
evidence indicates that employment arbitration cases are resolved 
substantially sooner than are litigated employment cases, regardless of the 
type of claim alleged.118 Arbitration defenders also argue that arbitration 
 
 110. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 41, at 44. 
 111. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 199 (1997); Stephen Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other 
Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735 (2001). 
 112. Colvin, supra note 34, at 6; Maltby, supra note 107, at 48. 
 113. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 41, at 44. 
 114. Bingham, supra note 111, at 209–10; Colvin, supra note 34, at 13. 
 115. Colvin, supra note 34, at 14–15. 
 116. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 111, at 192–94; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, 
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 
449 (1996). 
 117. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: 
Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 99 (1999). 
 118. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 41, at 51 (finding that mean and median times in 
arbitration ranged from seven to thirteen months while mean and median times in both state 
and federal courts exceeded twenty months). 
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better enables the parties to resolve disputes while preserving a positive 
working relationship and that employer cost savings can be rechanneled 
into more generous employee compensation and benefits.119 But even 
defenders of employment arbitration acknowledge that some contractual 
provisions and practices could prove harmful to employees.120 
Persistent concerns about employment arbitration have caused some 
countries to refuse to enforce arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts.121 During the past few years, Congress has regularly considered 
but not passed an Arbitration Fairness Act that would also preclude courts 
from enforcing such clauses.122 As a matter of current governing federal law 
in the U.S.,123 however, state and federal courts must enforce arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts to the same extent as any other arbitration 
clause.124 
In response to the controversy surrounding employment arbitration, 
some arbitration associations have made efforts to self-regulate. To better 
protect employee interests, and to help preserve the validity of employment 
arbitration, the major U.S. arbitration associations have drafted protocols 
that each employer must satisfy as a prerequisite to the association handling 
its employment disputes. For example, JAMS provides Employment 
Arbitration Minimum Standards that require, among other things, that 
(1) all remedies available under applicable law remain available to the 
employee; (2) the employee is provided with at least minimally adequate 
discovery rights; (3) fees and costs incurred by the employee are reasonable 
and not so large as to preclude employee claim prosecution; and (4) the 
 
 119. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 111, at 754 & n.92 (noting that fans of the Gilmer case argue 
that employment arbitration benefits everyone). 
 120. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); Sherwyn et al., supra note 117, at 147 (acknowledging that 
mandatory arbitration is not perfect). For models of employment arbitration producing both 
efficiencies and inefficiencies, see Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employment 
Arbitration Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1 (2004), and Hylton, supra note 23. 
 121. Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory 
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 
(2002). One author suggests that the high union density in other countries makes labor courts 
cost-effective and attractive, resulting in less demand for labor arbitration. See Samuel 
Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 793 
(1990). 
 122. For current text, see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 123. Section 1 of the FAA contains language that could have been interpreted to exclude 
employment arbitration from its coverage. In defining the scope of applicability of the FAA, 
Congress provided “but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to exclude 
only interstate transportation workers. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 124. See supra Part II.B. 
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arbitrator provides a written award containing reasons for her decision.125 
The AAA Employment Due Process Protocol provides employees with 
similar rights to discovery, reasonable fees, and costs and remedies available 
under applicable law in their disputes involving statutory rights.126 
Some state courts use the unconscionability doctrine to independently 
police problematic terms in employment arbitration agreements, including 
those that provide for potentially biased arbitrator selection, impose 
prohibitively expensive costs to arbitrate, or so limit the employee’s rights in 
arbitration that effective claim prosecution or effective remedies are 
precluded. Other provisions that unilaterally restrict an employee’s right in 
arbitration are also heavily scrutinized. For example, a unilateral provision 
precluding the award of punitive damages to the employee only was similarly 
struck down as substantively unconscionable.127 And, in response to 
concerns about the repeat-player problem, California courts have refused to 
enforce arbitration clauses when the arbitral forum chosen by the employer 
is so small that the employer can at least implicitly exert pressure on the 
arbitrators to render decisions in its favor.128 
In addition to these measures, some courts also require mutuality in the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. In fact, at least one court has described 
mutuality as “the paramount consideration in assessing conscionability.”129 If 
an arbitration clause requires only the employee but not the employer to 
take claims to arbitration, then these courts will strike the arbitration 
clause.130 Mutuality helps to ensure fairness: “If the arbitration system 
 
 125. JAMS, JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2009), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_employment_ 
arbitration_rules-2009.pdf. These minimum standards do not apply to individually negotiated 
agreements. Id. at 4. 
 126. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2011), available at 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/lee/documents/document/mdaw/mdaz/
~edisp/adrstg_004368.pdf. 
 127. See Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 766–67 (Wash. 2004). 
 128. See Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678–79 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting 
that employer’s choice of arbitral forum resulted in only eight available arbitrators in the 
relevant district and finding that the potential for the repeat-player effect to influence the 
decision was one factor in its decision to strike the arbitration clause). 
 129. Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 436 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 130. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, 321 S.W.3d 429, 441–
42 & n.21 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (questioning but not deciding whether arbitration clause is 
sufficiently mutual when employer does not obligate itself to submit its disputes to arbitration); 
cf. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004) (striking 
an arbitration agreement in consumer contract obligating only the consumer to arbitrate); 
Simpson v. Grimes, 2002-0869 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/21/03); 849 So. 2d 740, abrogated by 
Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 2004-2804, 2004-2857 (La. 6/29/05); 908 So. 2d 1. But see 
Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 453 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding one-sided obligation to arbitrate); 
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established by the employer is indeed fair, then the employer as well as the 
employee should be willing to submit claims to arbitration.”131 Even when 
the arbitration clause appears to obligate both parties to participate in 
binding arbitration, courts can strike it as unconscionable when the 
employer reserves for itself an unfettered right to modify or to terminate the 
arbitration plan without prior notice to the employee.132 In these cases, it 
appears that the mutual obligation to arbitrate is illusory.133 When the 
arbitration provision is found to lack mutuality, the employee is permitted to 
proceed with litigation notwithstanding the presence of an arbitration 
agreement. 
Even if the parties appear to mutually commit to arbitrate disputes, 
courts will sometimes strike an arbitration clause if the drafter carves out a 
right to bring claims to court and the claims carved out appear to represent 
the entirety of the drafter’s claims. Consider, for example, the arbitration 
clause at issue in Sutton’s Steel and Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc.134 
BellSouth’s standard-form contract included an arbitration clause that 
obligated both it and the customer to resolve disputes in arbitration, but in a 
separate clause, the company reserved the right to bring court actions 
against the customer to collect debts owed.135 The court found that this 
carveout compromised the mutuality of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, 
especially because it seemed implausible that BellSouth would ever have 
claims against its customers other than claims for the collection of moneys 
owed.136 In effect, the carveout took back the company’s promise to arbitrate 
claims. Similar reasoning is sometimes used in the context of arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts,137 although it is less clear at what point an 
employer has carved out all conceivable claims against an employee. 
 
Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872 (N.J. 2002) (upholding potentially unilateral 
arbitration clause); Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that it is not unconscionable to require only employee to arbitrate where the terms of 
the arbitration appear fair to the employee). 
 131. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692. 
 132. Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); Floss v. Ryan’s 
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315–16 (6th Cir. 2000); Gibson v. Neighborhood 
Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997); Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 
2d 5, 14–15 (D. Me. 2001); Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2009); 
Frye, 321 S.W.3d at 442 & n.21; Redmond v. Big Sandy Furniture, Inc., No. 08CA12, 2008 WL 
4966549 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2008); Salazar v. Citadel Commc’ns Corp., 2004-NMSC-013, 
135 N.M. 447, 90 P.3d 466; J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003). 
 133. See, e.g., Dumais, 299 F.3d at 1219; Salazar, 2004-NMSC-013, 91 12; Webster, 128 S.W.3d 
at 232. 
 134. Sutton’s Steel & Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., 00-511, 00-898 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 12/13/00); 776 So. 2d 589, abrogated by Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 2004-2804, 
2004-2857 (La. 6/29/05); 908 So. 2d 1 
 135. Id. at p. 9–11, 776 So. 2d 596–97. 
 136. Id. at p. 10–11, 766 So. 2d 597. 
 137. Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 676–77 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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In truth, courts do not agree on the doctrinal foundation for mutuality. 
Some place the issue within unconscionability, reasoning that it is 
fundamentally unfair for an employer to force employees to submit claims to 
arbitration without itself agreeing to submit its claims to arbitration.138 
Other courts treat the issue as one of consideration,139 reasoning that the 
arbitration agreement is a separate agreement from the remainder of the 
employment agreement and that therefore something other than the terms 
of the employment contract must support the employee’s promise to 
arbitrate. The consideration doctrine is a blunter regulatory tool than is 
unconscionability. Courts using the consideration doctrine must either 
enforce or refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement,140 whereas those 
using unconscionability have the authority to enforce part of the arbitration 
clause, while striking the portion perceived to be unfair.141 More importantly 
for present purposes, under consideration analysis, courts typically do not 
inquire into adequacy or fairness; anything given by the employer, whether a 
return promise or a small bonus, would be sufficient.142 For courts using the 
consideration doctrine, then, the employee’s promise to arbitrate claims can 
be supported by a promise on the part of the employer to submit any claims 
to arbitration.143 But for courts using the unconscionability doctrine to 
scrutinize the agreement, more obligation on the part of the employer may 
be necessary to establish fundamental fairness. 
In particular, courts using the unconscionability doctrine are more 
likely to look past the agreement’s bilateral arbitration obligations to inquire 
into whether the drafter has used carveout provisions to reserve a greater 
(albeit qualified) right to resort to courts. California courts, in particular, 
express concern that when the employer carves out a right to bring even a 
small number of its claims to court, it is preserving for itself a procedural 
advantage not realistically offered to employees. In several cases, the 
California courts have refused to order an employee to arbitrate her claims 
 
 138. See supra note 130. 
 139. See supra note 130; see also Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 
S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 2000) (consumer loan agreement). 
 140. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (listing consideration as 
requirement of contract). 
 141. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (“If a 
contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid 
any unconscionable result.”). 
 142. See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 95, at 62 (discussing adequacy of consideration 
requirement). 
 143. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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on grounds that the employer has tainted the arbitration clause by including 
such carveouts. Almost always, the carveouts are for the very types of claims 
that we commonly observe in CEO employment contracts. Specifically, 
carveouts rendering the arbitration clause substantively unconscionable have 
included rights to bring the following types of claims to court: noncompete-
clause claims;144 claims involving intellectual-property rights;145 and 
confidentiality clause or other proprietary-information claims.146 On the 
other hand, carveouts for preliminary relief that mirror the rights to such 
relief already afforded to arbitrated disputes under state law are 
permitted.147 
On the surface, California has not rendered these unilateral carveouts 
categorically impermissible. California courts have consistently stated that 
carveouts and other forms of nonmutuality will not render an arbitration 
clause unconscionable if the employer can justify the carveouts with 
evidence of a legitimate business need.148 However, we are not aware of a 
single case where a California court has found the employer’s business 
justification to be sufficient to preserve the arbitration clause.149 
In Mercuro v. Superior Court,150 for example, the arbitration clause 
included carveouts for injunctive or other equitable relief for unfair 
competition, unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets, or violation of 
 
 144. See, e.g., Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004); Stirlen v. Supercuts, 
Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997); see also Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 663 (Ct. App. 2004) (unfair competition claims); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 671 (Ct. App. 2002) (fee sharing). 
 145. See, e.g., Kalmbach v. Sportsmobile W., Inc., No. F054648, 2008 WL 4988663 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 25, 2008); Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (intellectual property); Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
663 (trade secrets); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(trade secrets); O’Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (Ct. App. 2003) (trade 
secrets); Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (intellectual-property violations and trade secrets); 
Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (patent infringement). 
 146. See, e.g., Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (confidentiality-clause claims); Martinez, 12 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 663 (misuse or disclosure of confidential information); Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 
(confidential and proprietary information); O’Hare, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (confidentiality-
clause claims); Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (confidential information); Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 138 (improper use of confidential information). 
 147. See, e.g., Clarus Sys., Inc. v. Variphy, Inc., No. A115360, 2007 WL 576149, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2007); Inter@ctive, Inc. v. Cubic Transp. Sys., Inc., No. D047096, 2007 WL 
178429, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007); cf. Htay Htay Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts 
Franchise Corp., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547 (Ct. App. 2011) (franchise contract). 
 148. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 
2000) (inference of unconscionability can be overcome if employer has reasonable justification 
for the nonmutuality); Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 103 (upholding nonmutual arbitration 
agreement only if the stronger party can show, through the contract or other facts, that 
“business realities” create a special need for the advantage); cf. Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
677–78 (rejecting employer’s proffered evidence of business justification as insufficient). 
 149. See, e.g., Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88; O’Hare, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116; Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 671; Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138. 
 150. Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671. 
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intellectual-property rights. The employer attempted unsuccessfully to justify 
the carveouts on the ground that monetary damages for misappropriation of 
its intellectual-property assets would be difficult to calculate and that in any 
event money damages would not protect it from further misappropriation.151 
The court rejected the employer’s argument in part by stating that it had no 
evidence to support its business justification.152 This and other questionable 
provisions in the arbitration clause resulted in the clause being struck in its 
entirety.153 
Consider also Fitz v. NCR Corp.154 The arbitration clause at issue carved 
out disputes involving the parties’ confidentiality or noncompete 
agreements and those involving its intellectual-property rights.155 In 
addition, the clause carved out some employee claims like worker’s 
compensation and unemployment insurance proceedings, as well as agency 
proceedings for discrimination or other civil rights violations.156 The court 
concluded that the employer could not justify its carveouts by a need for 
provisional relief in courts because California law already gives parties some 
limited ability to obtain provisional relief.157 The company had cited to some 
cases where employees rather than employers have brought noncompete 
and intellectual-property-rights claims to court, but the court nevertheless 
found it problematic that most such claims are brought by employers.158 The 
employer argued that it had only carved out a fraction of its possible claims 
and had obligated itself to arbitrate others, including theft and 
embezzlement claims, but the court thought these claims were unlikely.159 
Finally, the company argued that it had also agreed to carve out some 
employee claims, but the court cited Mercuro to conclude that those claims 
would be separately maintained by an administrative agency in any event.160 
Here too the court struck the entire arbitration clause from the employment 
contract.161 
In striking arbitration clauses with carveouts, the California courts have 
not confined their role to the protection of low-level employees. The same 
scrutiny has been applied to carveouts in the arbitration clause of a franchise 
contract,162 and to employment disputes brought by the employer’s vice 
 
 151. Id. at 677–78. 
 152. Id. at 678. 
 153. Id. at 684. 
 154. Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88. 
 155. Id. at 92. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 105. 
 158. Id. at 104. 
 159. Id. at 104–05. 
 160. Id. at 92, 104. 
 161. Id. at 106–07. 
 162. See Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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president of operations,163 vice president and chief financial officer,164 and 
president and CEO.165 This extension is remarkable, given that procedural 
unconscionability is much less likely in the employment contracts of 
company executives.166 
To our knowledge no other courts have subjected carveouts to 
arbitration agreements in employment contracts to the same exacting 
scrutiny as have the California courts. One non-California court struck an 
arbitration clause with carveouts similar to those found in the California 
cases, but the court interpreted the carveout provision as completely 
eliminating any obligation on the part of the employer to arbitrate its 
claims.167 In addition, the JAMS Employment Arbitration Minimum 
Standards168 impose a mutuality requirement on arbitration clauses in 
employment contracts, but its requirement is less stringent than California’s. 
The Minimum Standards provide that “[b]oth the employer and the 
employee must have the same obligation (either to arbitrate or go to court) 
with respect to the same kinds of claims.”169 Presumably nothing in this 
standard prevents an employer from carving out particular types of claims, 
so long as both employer and employee are by the terms of the clause 
permitted to bring such claims in court (as was true in Fitz). California 
courts often take the lead in scrutinizing arbitration clauses, so California’s 
scrutiny of carveouts from employment-contract arbitration agreements 
could well spread to other courts. 
In this Article we seek a better understanding of the use of carveouts in 
the arbitration clauses contained in CEO employment contracts. How 
common are carveouts? What types of claims are carved out? Does the 
frequency of the use of carveouts depend on the type of firm? Are firms 
based in California less likely to carve out claims, given the precedent in 
California? And, given that our contracts are heavily negotiated employment 
contracts, does their content shed light on the soundness of the California 
courts’ reasoning regarding the mutuality of party obligations to arbitrate? 
We now turn to our research questions. 
 
 163. See Kalmbach v. Sportsmobile W., Inc., No. F054648, 2008 WL 4988663, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008) 
 164. See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 140 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 165. See Trivedi v. Curexo Tech. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 166. Cf. Guiliano v. Inland Empire Pers., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 14–16 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that protections of Armendariz do not apply in case brought by company executive vice 
president and chief financial officer, at least when his dispute involves a right to a multimillion-
dollar bonus rather than an unwaivable statutory claim). 
 167. See Hull v. Norcrom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 168. See JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/Documents/ 
JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Employment_Min_Stds-2009.pdf. 
 169. Id. at 4. 
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III. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
We begin our empirical analysis with a description of our data-
collection procedure and an overview of the prevalence of arbitration 
clauses in our sample. We then present some univariate statistics concerning 
the use of arbitration clauses, followed by a discussion of the more refined 
forms of customization of these clauses. We conclude this section with an 
analysis of the use of litigation carveouts in these agreements and the 
“California” effect on these provisions. 
A. THE CONTRACTS SAMPLE AND THE PREVALENCE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
We generated a sample of CEO employment contracts by creating a list 
of all of the companies included in the S&P 1500 from 1995 to 2005. Using 
this list, we examined each of these companies’ mandatory securities-law 
filings under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act in the SEC’s EDGAR 
database. We employed a privately owned version of this database, Live 
Edgar, for ease of manual and electronic search techniques. 
Using Live Edgar, we checked each company’s Form 10-K (annual 
report) filings to see if the company mentioned that its CEO had an 
employment contract. If so, we searched for these employment contracts, 
which are attached as an exhibit to one of the firm’s securities filings. If they 
exist, these contracts are required disclosures for every registered company. 
Whenever we found one of the contracts, we downloaded it and coded it 
using a coding system that we created in order to gather the requisite 
information. We found a total of 1970 contracts in this search. 
We found several different variations in CEO employment contract 
types.170 For our purposes, the three most important contract types are 
initial contracts, contract amendments, and restated contracts. Initial 
contracts are those that are entered into between the company and its new 
CEO, or in some cases, by a company and its current CEO when the firm’s 
prior relationship with the CEO was not the subject of a written employment 
contract. Generally, CEOs and firms enter into initial contracts at the 
beginning of their employment relationships. 
Contract amendments can be initiated at any time for any reason once 
an employment contract is in place. They are typically quite short and affect 
only a few terms of the initial (or restated) contract, usually specifying 
changes in the CEO’s compensation arrangement. They rarely alter any 
noncompensation-related terms of the employment relationship. We did not 
 
 170. We made no attempt to include all of the other various contractual agreements that 
exist between CEOs and their firms. For example, we did not include change-of-control 
agreements in our sample, although some of these agreements include arbitration provisions. 
We recognized that these other forms of agreement may affect the employment relationship 
between the firm and its managers, but we decided to leave them for a later day in order to 
maintain our focus on employment contracts. 
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find a single case where these amendments altered the arrangements, or 
lack thereof, providing for arbitration of any dispute between the parties. 
For this reason, we decided to drop these contract amendments from our 
sample. This decision reduced our sample by 1052 observations. 
Restated contracts (sometimes called “amended and restated 
contracts”) are contracts that are entered into subsequent to the initial 
contract, usually after one or more amendments have been made to the 
initial contract. A restated contract incorporates all of the changes made in 
the various amendments, and it also frequently adds new terms. This new, 
integrated document reflects all of the terms of the employment contract 
between the CEO and the firm. We included these agreements in our 
sample for three reasons. First, in some instances, the initial contracts are 
unavailable.171 Second, restated contracts can result in changes to the 
arbitration arrangements in the parties’ agreement. Finally, they provide us 
with some insight into the “stickiness” of arbitration provisions, that is, 
whether their presence in an earlier CEO contract is likely to persist in later 
ones. 
Next, for some of the variables included in our multivariate analysis, we 
needed additional information about the CEOs and their companies. For 
this information, we used the Compustat database maintained by Standard 
and Poor’s. It contains company-specific descriptive and financial-statement 
data for the past twenty years on an annual basis for companies that have 
actively traded securities at any point during that time period. The 
Compustat database enabled us to collect information about firm 
performance, the company’s principal business line, firm size, and the state 
of the headquarters for the firms where our CEOs worked. The firm 
performance variables are sales and return on capital. Return on capital is 
defined as net income divided by capital. Capital is the book value of debt 
and equity as reported on the firm’s balance sheet. Return on capital is then 
averaged over the five-year period prior to the start date of the CEO’s 
compensation contract. After eliminating contracts for which this 
information was unavailable, we ended up with 910 contracts in our 
sample.172 
For each employment contract in our sample, we coded the presence or 
absence of an arbitration clause. For each of the employment contracts 
containing an arbitration clause, we coded a wide variety of additional 
information about the contents of the arbitration provision, including 
 
 171. This could happen if the initial contracts were entered into prior to May 6, 1996, 
when the SEC mandated that all companies file electronically on the EDGAR database, or if the 
company failed to disclose an earlier contract. We searched diligently to find all prior contracts 
to confirm wherever possible if they contained an arbitration clause. 
 172. We could have included all of the CEO employment contracts in our analysis; 
however, the absence of the additional data on certain variables would have made it difficult to 
test different explanations for the presence or absence of arbitration provisions. 
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whether the parties: (1) chose an arbitration association (and if so, which 
one); (2) specified the rules of procedure that arbitration would follow; 
(3) chose a specific number of arbitrators to resolve disputes; (4) chose a 
location for arbitration (and if so, where); (5) contractually allocated the 
costs of arbitration; (6) provided a limitations period for filing for 
arbitration; (7) addressed rules of discovery or rules of evidence; 
(8) contractually prohibited the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages; 
(9) were bound to keep the contents of arbitration proceedings 
confidential; (10) obligated the arbitrator to issue a written opinion 
justifying her decision; and (11) reserved the right to appeal the arbitrator’s 
decision to an arbitration-appeal panel or to the courts. In addition, we 
coded the contracts for whether the parties carved out a right to have courts 
grant preliminary relief and whether the parties carved out particular types 
of claims for court resolution, including claims involving the 
confidentiality,173 noncompete,174 nonsolicitation,175 and 
nondisparagement176 provisions of the agreement. 
Turning to the presence or absence of arbitration provisions, we see in 
Table 1 that of the 910 contracts studied, 469 (52%) provided for 
arbitration of at least some of the parties’ disputes, and their arbitration 
provisions typically required both parties to proceed to mandatory, binding 
arbitration.177 This proportion is consistent with the results of two earlier 
studies by one or more of the authors of this Article.178 
In an earlier study by the authors of this Article, we noted that the 
overall average of about half masks an upward trend in the use of arbitration 
over time—from an observed low of 36% of the contracts in 1997 to a high 
of 60% of contracts in 2005.179 A simple linear regression of the percentage 
of contracts containing arbitration provisions each year against time 
indicated a statistically significant upward slope.180 This trend indicates a 
 
 173. Confidentiality provisions state that the executive promises not to disclose certain 
information about the firm and its activities. 
 174. Noncompete provisions bar executives from competing with the company for a period 
of time after the termination of their employment position with the company. See Schwab & 
Thomas, supra note 28 at 254–57. 
 175. Nonsolicitation provisions stop departing executives from soliciting employees and 
clients of their employer to change their allegiances and move to the new firm where the 
executive will be working. 
 176. Nondispargement clauses are designed to ensure that departing executives do not 
make negative comments or statements about their former employer. 
 177. Arbitration clauses can alternatively provide for optional arbitration or for nonbinding 
arbitration, where an arbitrator provides a recommended settlement. None of our contracts 
provided for nonbinding arbitration, and only a handful provided for optional arbitration. 
 178. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 28; Thomas, O’Hara & Martin, supra note 50, at 981. 
 179. Thomas, O’Hara & Martin, supra note 50, at 981. 
 180. The t-statistic on the slope was 3.84. Id. at 981 n.71. 
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California firms. Using a chi-squared test for statistical significance, we reject 
the null hypothesis of no difference.182 This suggests that California firms 
are more wary of courts in general than are non-California firms. 
We also wanted to know whether information technology firms (“IT 
firms”) are more likely to want to arbitrate disputes than other types of firms 
(“non-IT firms”). We had no clear hypothesis regarding the question, 
however. On the one hand, if IT firms can garner more value from 
noncompete clauses that are reliably enforced across state borders, then we 
would expect IT firms to choose arbitration more often than non-IT firms, 
given that some courts will heavily scrutinize noncompete clauses in 
employment contracts and California courts refuse to enforce them 
altogether.183 On the other hand, a cursory glance at our collected data 
indicated that companies commonly carve out noncompete clauses and 
other information-protecting clauses for court resolution. If IT firms 
disproportionately rely on such provisions to protect firm value, they might 
be inclined to forgo arbitration altogether in order to ensure court 
protection of the rights they most value. To test whether there might be a 
difference in the use of arbitration clauses for IT firms, our null hypothesis 
was that there is no difference. To test this claim, we coded the firms into IT 
firms and non-IT firms. The firms were categorized according to whether 
they were classified as being in the information technology economic sector 
using the Global Industry Classification Standard (“GICS”) as reported in 
Compustat. Of the CEO contracts having arbitration clauses, there were 115 
CEO contracts for IT firms and 354 CEO contracts for non-IT firms. Table 1 
shows that 62% of IT firms had arbitration clauses in their contracts, 
whereas only 49% of non-IT firms did. The difference is statistically 
significant, indicating that the IT firms have a definite preference for 
arbitration.184 
B. ARBITRATION PROCEDURE AND COST FINDINGS 
We turn next to the contents of the arbitration provisions. We began by 
examining whether or not the parties chose a specific arbitration 
association. In our sample, when the parties chose arbitration, they almost 
always specified an arbitration association that would handle their disputes, 
and they also virtually always chose a governing set of procedural rules for 
arbitral proceedings. As shown in Table 2, in 435 out of 469 (93%) of the 
contracts with arbitration clauses, the parties chose an arbitration 
association, and in another 6 contracts specifically selected a method for 
arbitration without choosing a specific association (for a total of 441 
contracts). Only 28, or about 6%, of the arbitration clauses in our sample 
 
 182. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 183. Gilson, supra note 69, at 607–09. 
 184. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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the issue. Moreover, many of their contracts contain arbitration clauses,189 
and silence in an arbitration clause does not necessarily indicate that the 
American rule would apply by default. Given that the allocation of attorney 
fees is most often left to the arbitrator to decide, silence in the context of a 
contract with an arbitration clause is much more likely to indicate no 
preference regarding the split of attorney fees.190 With silent contracts 
categorized as a preference for the American rule, Eisenberg and Miller find 
no preference between the American rule and the English rule: 39% of 
contracts fall in the former group and 35% of contracts fall in the latter 
group.191 Because we have good reason to believe that our silent contracts 
most likely indicate no preference, we can directly compare the number of 
contracts choosing the American rule, at most 52, with those choosing the 
English rule, 162. In our contracts, where parties expressed a clear 
preference, they were more than three times as likely to choose the English 
rule than the American rule. These contrary results are particularly striking, 
given that Eisenberg and Miller hypothesize that relational contracts 
(including employment contracts) should be more likely to choose the 
American rule.192 
C. OTHER FEATURES OF ARBITRATION CUSTOMIZATION 
Beyond these three factors—arbitration association, governing rules, 
and cost allocation—relatively few contracts customized the features of 
future arbitrations. This is clearly illustrated by the data presented in Table 
5. In our contracts, 57, or 12%, of the arbitration clauses included a 
provision that required the parties to keep confidential the details of a 
dispute. Only 47, or 10%, of the arbitration provisions stated that the 
arbitrator was required to provide a written statement of her findings. 
Roughly the same number of clauses prohibited the arbitrator from 
awarding punitive damages. In 30, or 6%, of the arbitration clauses, the 
parties agreed to permit discovery and specified how it would be conducted. 
We also find that in 21, or 4%, of the clauses, the parties limited the period 
of time after a claim arose in which parties could file an arbitration request. 
Even more rarely, in 8, or 2%, of the clauses, the parties agreed about what 
was permitted testimony in the arbitration hearing. And finally, in only 3, or 
0.6%, of the clauses, there were provisions addressing the parties’ right to 
appeal an arbitration decision to courts. 
  
 
 189. Id. at 4–5. 
 190. We say “much more likely” rather than “certainly” in the text because it is possible that 
some arbitration associations impose rules on arbitrators for how to allocate costs in the face of 
a silent contract, in which case silence could indicate a choice in favor of the association’s rule. 
However, many associations do not so constrain the arbitrator. 
 191. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 187, at 25. 
 192. Id. 
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Although these findings indicate that the parties often carved out 
particular types of disputes for court resolution, they underestimate the 
extent to which parties actually carved out the particular disputes—for many 
of the carveouts we do not know how often the contract clause on which the 
carveout was based actually appeared in a contract.196 To get an idea of how 
important this effect is, we coded for the presence of two very common (and 
therefore anticipated) types of contract provisions: confidentiality clauses 
and nonsolicitation provisions. In the case of confidentiality clauses, we 
coded contracts for the presence of any provisions requiring the CEO to 
keep information about the firm confidential or providing that the CEO 
could not disclose certain types of information. We found that 418 of the 
469 contracts containing arbitration clauses also contained confidentiality 
provisions. Of the 418 contracts with confidentiality provisions, 172, or 41%, 
of them carved out these disputes for court resolution. This is somewhat 
greater than the 37% (with confidentiality carveouts) of all the contracts 
with arbitration clauses (shown in Table 6). 
In the case of nonsolicitation clauses, we coded contracts for the 
presence of any clause prohibiting the executive from soliciting clients, 
customers, suppliers, or employees. We also coded contracts for the 
presence of any nonsolicitation carveouts, and found that 345, or 74%, of 
these contracts with arbitration clauses contained a nonsolicitation 
provision. Breaking this down further, we determined that 145, or 42%, of 
these contracts with arbitration provisions carved out disputes involving one 
or more of the nonsolicitation provisions. By comparison, Table 6 shows that 
employee nonsolicitation carveout clauses were found in 30%, and client 
nonsolicitation carveouts were in 22% of all contracts with arbitration 
clauses. Here too, the frequency with which disputes involving these clauses 
were carved out is actually significantly higher than our initial numbers 
indicated. 
Based on our analysis in Part II, we wanted to know whether there was a 
difference in the likelihood that IT and non-IT firms would carve out 
disputes from arbitration. We hypothesized that IT firms would be more 
likely to include these carveouts because, relative to non-IT firms, a higher 
fraction of the IT firms’ value should turn on its ability to protect 
information and innovation. Table 6 shows our findings. Comparing these 
two columns of percentages, there are several apparent differences between 
the firm types. As we predicted, the presence of at least one carveout is 
greater for IT-firm than non-IT-firm contracts (52% vs. 45%), but this 
 
 196. For example, while only 7% of the contracts with arbitration clauses carve out disputes 
involving the nondisparagement clause of the contract, it is likely that many, and perhaps most, 
of these contracts do not contain a nondisparagement provision. What we really need to know 
is how many contracts actually include nondisparagement clauses in order to determine how 
frequently such claims are carved out for court resolution. Unfortunately, we did not code for 
the frequency of nondisparagement clauses.  
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difference is present only for one specific category—preliminary injunctive 
relief (16% vs. 11%). For all other categories, non-IT-firm contracts are 
more likely to include litigation carveouts than are IT-firm contracts. These 
results surprised us initially. However, if IT firms are disproportionately 
located in California, the “California effect” for carveouts could be driving 
our IT-firm results. Our multivariate analysis in the next Part indicates that 
this is precisely what is happening. 
Turning to the possible “California effect,” the location of the firm’s 
business may also have an effect on carveouts. If California law influenced 
the contracting parties, then we should see a difference in the use of 
carveouts between contracts involving CEOs to be employed at firms 
primarily located in California and contracts for CEOs employed at firms 
located elsewhere. We hypothesized that contracts involving California firms 
would have fewer claim carveouts because the presence of these carveouts, 
particularly the presence of multiple such carveouts, can cause the 
California courts to strike the arbitration clause altogether. Table 6 presents 
the data for California and non-California firms. We first tested a null 
hypothesis that there was no difference in the incidence of the use of the 
coded carveouts based on whether the firm was primarily located in 
California or not. The data show that when comparing the likelihood of 
using any carveout in an arbitration provision, non-California firms were 
slightly more likely to incorporate any carveout into the provisions (44% of 
the California firm contracts compared with 47% of the non-California firm 
contracts), but that difference was not statistically significant. 
Regarding specific types of carveouts, however, Table 6 shows that non-
California firms were much more likely to incorporate most of the types of 
carveouts studied. For example, 25% of non-California firm arbitration 
clauses carved out disputes involving the client nonsolicitation clause of the 
contract, as compared with only 4% of the California firm provisions.197 
Similarly, 35% of the provisions in non-California firm contracts carved out 
disputes related to the employee nonsolicitation clause, as compared with 
just under 7% of the California firm provisions.198 Non-California firms were 
also more likely to carve out disputes involving the confidentiality and 
nondisparagement clauses of the agreement, and those differences were 
each statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. 
Disputes involving the noncompetition clause of the agreement were 
carved out in 38% of non-California firms compared with 5% of California 
firms.199 This difference could have multiple causes, however. Given that 
California courts will not enforce employee noncompete provisions, firms 
located in California might be more likely to steer clear of asking courts to 
 
 197. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  
 198. We find that this difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
 199. Again, this difference is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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enforce these provisions even without the unconscionable-employee-
arbitration-clause wrinkle. 
In contrast to these carveout provisions, Table 6 shows that California 
firms were more likely than non-California firms to incorporate a carveout 
for preliminary relief. We found that 24% of the California firms’ arbitration 
clauses, compared with only 10% of the non-California firms’ provisions, 
reserved a right to seek preliminary relief in court, a difference that is 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. 
These results suggest that California firms are responding to the 
California court precedents. The fact that California firms are just as likely to 
incorporate any carveouts, yet much less likely to incorporate a provision 
carving out any specific claim, suggests that the parties are cognizant of the 
California courts’ concern that multiple carveouts of firm claims creates 
unconscionable non-mutuality. It appears that California firms are forced to 
carve out fewer claims than they might otherwise carve out in order to 
preserve enforcement of the arbitration clause, a clause that California firms 
are more likely to seek in the first place. 
The fact that California firms are much more likely to carve out a right 
to seek preliminary relief in court also suggests that they are responding to 
the California courts because, as mentioned earlier, the courts have made 
clear that simple preliminary relief carveouts do not jeopardize arbitration 
clause enforcement.200 Although the preliminary relief carveouts enable 
California firms to freeze assets and stop infringing behavior so that 
arbitrators can resolve the parties’ dispute, separation of the dispute in this 
manner deprives the California courts of possible efficiency gains due to the 
courts having jurisdiction over the entire matter.201 
E. THE CALIFORNIA EFFECT: IT FIRMS VERSUS NON-IT FIRMS 
Given the surprising differences between IT firms and non-IT firms, 
and the differences between California and non-California firms, we 
investigated the possibility that there were interactive effects at work. To get 
a better sense of this possibility, in Table 7, we broke out the California firm 
contracts to compare IT-firm and non-IT-firm contracts. We found that 57% 
of California IT firms used carveouts, as compared with 31% of non-IT 
firms, a difference that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
difference initially seemed to indicate that although California firms avoid 
using carveouts, IT firms primarily located in California seem relatively more 
 
 200. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 201. Gary Born counsels against the carving out of claims on the ground that it invites 
bifurcated dispute resolution and therefore parallel proceedings. BORN, supra note 10, at 1127–
28. Note that carving out a right to proceed to court for preliminary relief but not resolution of 
the claims guarantees bifurcated dispute resolution. Parties outside of California may be carving 
out these claims for court resolution to minimize bifurcated proceedings notwithstanding the 
potential risks that Born identifies. 
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independent variables as in Table 8, and their definitions are given at the 
top of the table. 
The results show a consistent, significant positive time trend for all six 
models. Carveouts are becoming increasingly common in our contracts, and 
more carveouts are appearing in each contract. In Models 3, 4, 5, and 6, we 
find a strong, statistically significant, and negative relationship between firms 
primarily located in California and the number of carveouts contained in 
their contracts. California firms clearly use fewer carveouts than firms 
located outside of California. 
Model 2, which examines the presence of any carveout, offers some 
intriguing results as well. There is a weakly significant, negative effect on the 
presence of carveouts for California based firms, but this is offset for IT firms 
located in the state. California IT firms are significantly more likely than 
California non-IT firms to have at least one court carveout in their CEO’s 
employment contract. This is consistent with the univariate results shown in 
Table 7. Models 3 and 4 were included to determine whether California IT 
firms were more likely to include a larger number of carveouts from 
arbitration. The results indicate that the California IT firms are as reluctant 
to include multiple carveouts as are the California non-IT firms. Models 5 
and 6 were included to determine whether California IT firms were more or 
less likely to use preliminary relief carveouts, which are upheld by California 
courts, rather than claim carveouts, which are more heavily scrutinized by 
those courts. We see no change in the main results reported above, 
indicating no significant differences across the different types of California 
firms. 
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advantages of arbitration and litigation to be about equal. Far more 
franchise contracts provide carveouts from arbitration than do the CEO 
employment contracts, however. Only about half of the CEO employment 
contracts with arbitration clauses contain carveouts, but virtually all of the 
franchise agreements contain them.206 Why are there fewer carveouts in the 
CEO employment contracts? One explanation is that a higher fraction of 
franchise contracts are not negotiated; thus, the franchise contracts could 
more closely represent the preferences of the franchisor, which are muted 
in the CEO contracts by the ability of CEOs to have their preferences 
observed. This possibility is strengthened by the fact that the franchise 
contracts studied are the company’s standard-form contract, so even if 
individual franchisees can bargain to change the agreement, those changes 
would not appear in the empirical results. Another explanation, explored 
below, is that legal restrictions force the parties in the CEO employment 
contract negotiations to incorporate fewer carveouts in their agreements 
than appear in franchise contracts. And finally, because guidelines for 
standard-form contracts are publicly available,207 franchise contracts might 
have achieved a greater degree of industry standardization than have CEO 
employment contracts. Obviously, more study of these carveouts is needed. 
Other questions beg for the further study of carveouts from arbitration. 
Are carveouts equally present in other types of arbitration clauses? There is 
evidence that consumer contracts often carve out consumers’ small 
claims,208 probably because the major arbitration associations209 (and some 
courts)210 require that consumers be granted these protections. 
Is the frequency of the use of carveouts positively or negatively 
correlated with the use of arbitration clauses in the first place? Put 
differently, do carveouts make parties more comfortable with arbitration, 
increasing the use of arbitration clauses, or do carveouts signal problems 
with arbitration such that a high incidence of carveouts may serve as a proxy 
for a relatively low demand for arbitration? As an initial matter, in the 
regression, the presence of an arbitration clause in a prior contract did not 
significantly affect the likelihood of the presence of a carveout, suggesting 
that parties long comfortable with arbitration seemed to use carveouts just as 
often (or as rarely) as other parties. We can glean relatively little from this 
observation, however. Some carveouts might be positively correlated and 
some negatively correlated with the use of arbitration clauses. For example, 
it is likely that some carveouts aid or facilitate arbitration, and we would 
expect those to be positively correlated with the use of arbitration clauses. 
 
 206. Id. at 739–40. 
 207. See, e.g., 2008 Franchise Registration and Disclosure Guidelines, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, 
INC., http://mn.gov/commerce/images/NASAA_guidelines.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2012). 
 208. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 60, at 5, 15. 
 209. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 61. 
 210. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 60, at 2. 
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Preliminary relief carveouts might serve this function. Others, especially 
carveouts for the resolution of claims rather than remedies, might signal 
general disadvantages to arbitration. Here, a negative correlation is more 
likely. A comparison of California and non-California firm contracts, 
presented below, shows this basic pattern, but again, much more study is 
needed. 
Are carveouts equally common for contracting parties outside the 
U.S.?211 Are they perhaps less common in cross-border contracts, where 
concerns about a neutral litigation forum might arise?212 Are different types 
of carveouts present in contracts drafted by parties outside of the U.S.? To 
the extent that carveouts reflect the relative advantages of courts and 
arbitration, a country with a weaker or stronger judiciary and/or weaker or 
stronger arbitral forums might generate very different carveout behaviors.213 
Despite a large number of unanswered questions, the carveouts studied 
in the CEO employment contracts are instructive and can be used to reach 
tentative conclusions. For one, the carveouts present in these contracts, as 
well as in the franchise contracts, seem primarily focused on using courts to 
protect the value of the firm’s information, reputation, and innovation. 
These carveouts suggest that although arbitration may provide a cost-
effective and otherwise efficient mechanism for parties to enforce standard 
contractual rights and for recovering standard legal remedies, courts are 
needed to provide property-type protections, including the provision of 
equitable relief. Property-type protections can provide relief swiftly,214 they 
can help prevent future violations,215 and they can help parties protect 
against loss to third parties.216 These features are especially important in 
cases where money damages are likely hard to prove and are, therefore, 
often unrecoverable.217 
Of course these insights could be sharpened with further study. For 
example, when parties carve out disputes for courts, which courts do they 
 
 211. One of us is in the process of studying carveouts in technology firm business contracts. 
For example, in contracts involving two Chinese firms, no carveouts were found. O’Connor, 
supra note 22. 
 212. See id. (finding that carveouts are also popular for cross-border contracts, but the 
sample is small, and almost all contracts include one U.S. contracting party). 
 213. Id. (comparing contracts between U.S. companies with contracts between Chinese 
companies). 
 214. Cf. Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for 
Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 570, 577 (2007) (noting that in intellectual-
property litigation, quick injunctive relief is sought “because time is of the essence”). 
 215. This was a business justification offered in Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
671, 677–78 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 216. Cf. Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 835, 
864 (2008) (discussing use of injunctions to prevent third-party violations of patent rights as a 
property protection). 
 217. See Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677–78. 
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choose? Are the parties seeking the advantages of particular courts, or do 
they wish to preserve the right to obtain relief in any court where the 
contract rights are likely to be violated (rights to information, reputation, 
and innovations are intangibles)? To the extent that parties contract for 
particular courts at least some of the time, those choices can provide lessons 
to other courts about how to better protect and promote these interests. 
Future studies should also identify any links between the use of carveouts 
and the parties’ choice of arbitral forum. Some arbitral forums may better 
provide quick relief to the parties prior to the start of formal arbitral 
proceedings, or they might provide for expedited arbitration in certain 
circumstances.218 Do contracts choosing these arbitral forums contain fewer 
carveouts? If so, the results could provide guidance to other arbitration 
associations regarding their services. 
B. CARVEOUTS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
The arbitration clauses in CEO employment contracts have important 
policy implications for the regulation of employment arbitration clauses 
more generally. For most employment contracts, the employer unilaterally 
drafts the agreement with the vast majority of terms offered to the employee 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Recently, attention has focused on arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts. Although arbitration can provide cheap 
and quick dispute resolution that carries the promise of preserving the 
employment relationship, it can also be used to disadvantage employees in 
unfair ways. First, in some cases the costs of arbitration are so high that, if 
forced to pay them, the employee can be effectively prevented from 
vindicating some or all of her claims.219 Cost concerns have been addressed 
by employers, who have in many cases agreed to pay some or all of the 
arbitration costs,220 and by arbitration associations, which now offer low-cost 
arbitration of employment disputes.221 
 
 218. See, e.g., IP LAW 360, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR COPYRIGHT AND 
TRADEMARK MATTERS 4 (2006), available at http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/si.asp? 
id=4328; Peter J.W. Sherwin & Douglas C. Rennie, Interim Relief Under International Arbitration 
Rules and Guidelines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 317, 322–29 (2009). 
 219. See generally Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to 
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 143 (2002) (surveying federal court cases addressing concerns regarding the 
employee’s arbitration costs).  
 220. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 823–25 (2008) (discussing studies demonstrating an employer’s 
willingness to pay for an employee’s arbitration costs). 
 221. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES 40–42 (2010), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/ 
UCM/ADRSTG_004362&revision=latestreleased (documenting the costs of an arbitration “For 
Disputes Arising Out of Employer-Promulgated Plans”). 
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Second, arbitration agreements can have the effect of circumventing 
procedural and other statutory safeguards provided to employees.222 Here 
too some of the arbitration associations have provided for the protection of 
employees with Due Process Protocols,223 and a review of the case law 
indicates that employers have responded to judicial and private pressures by 
incorporating fairer provisions into their arbitration clauses. The difficulties, 
however, have not been fully resolved, due in part to weaker discovery rules, 
fee-shifting provisions, and other procedural devices put in place to provide 
cheaper employment arbitration.224 
Third, even with ostensibly fair cost and procedural provisions, some 
express concern that arbitration is inevitably biased toward the employer. 
Specifically, the concern is that some arbitrators feel beholden to the 
employer, as a repeat player and the party responsible for the arbitration 
bill; and moreover, the employer, knowing more about how arbitrators are 
likely to resolve disputes, is able to make a self-interested choice.225 In 
response to this concern, at least one California court has determined that it 
is suspect for a large employer to designate an arbitral forum and district 
with a small number of available arbitrators.226 Note that the larger firms’ 
contracts in our sample were more likely to choose the larger AAA dispute 
resolution. Perhaps this is a result of active bargaining on the part of the 
CEOs. 
As mentioned earlier, members of Congress have responded to these 
and other concerns by introducing a bill entitled the Arbitration Fairness 
Act that would prohibit the enforcement of predispute mandatory binding 
arbitration clauses in employment and consumer contracts.227 In an earlier 
article we argued that the CEO contracts provided evidence that a blanket 
prohibition on the enforcement of employment arbitration clauses would be 
overly broad.228 After all, the CEO contracts were jointly negotiated by 
sophisticated parties who were often represented by attorneys, and half of 
these contracts called for employment arbitration typically specifying the 
same arbitration forums and rules that are chosen for other employment 
contracts. The CEO contracts provide a glimpse of what employment 
contracts would look like if employees had roughly equal bargaining power 
 
 222. See Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration Agreements After 
Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 779, 786 (2003) (discussing such possibility). 
 223. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 61 (including the Due Process Protocol). 
 224. See, e.g., Trivedi v. Curexo Tech. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding 
unacceptable a provision entitling the prevailing party to recover attorney fees because it has 
the effect of circumventing state antidiscrimination law protections for employees); Fitz v. NCR 
Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Ct. App. 2004) (striking arbitration clause for multiple problems, 
including curtailment of an employee’s discovery rights). 
 225. See supra note 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra note 128. 
 227. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Thomas, O’Hara & Martin, supra note 50, at 999–1000. 
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with their employers, and they therefore indicate that arbitration likely is 
often in the interests of employees. To be sure, the unilaterally imposed 
contracts should be scrutinized to ensure that individual arbitration 
provisions are fair to employees, but a blanket prohibition on the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses seemed unwarranted. 
Our analysis also indicates that the California court condemnation of 
the types of carveouts that we observed is misplaced. Recall that the 
California courts will strike the arbitration clause from an employment 
contract when the employer has carved out some of its claims for court 
resolution. Although California state law purports to permit these carveouts 
if the employer proves that they serve a legitimate business justification, to 
date it appears that no California appellate court has deemed an offered 
justification to be sufficient. And yet, the justifications offered by 
employers—a need for quick relief in order to effectively protect 
information and intellectual property, a need to protect against future 
violations, and a need to establish intellectual-property rights as against third 
parties—do seem to be legitimate justifications for the carveouts. The CEO 
contracts lend credence to these justifications, especially since these 
carveouts seem to be valuable enough to firms to commonly appear in 
heavily negotiated agreements. In fact, taken as a whole our CEO contract 
analysis provides substantial evidence that the types of carveouts we observe 
with some frequency should be considered per se justified by legitimate 
business purposes. Court protection of overreaching by employers in the 
context of employment arbitration provisions might well make sense, but 
this particular form of paternalism is not necessary.229 
Indeed, our study suggests that California court paternalism is more 
than simply unnecessary; it has the effect of denying firms a tool they 
apparently find valuable for protecting the value of the firm’s information, 
reputation, and innovation. Specifically, as our study indicates, firms 
primarily located in California are significantly less likely to carve out claims 
for resolution by courts than are firms located elsewhere. Given that firms 
located elsewhere seem to derive value from the carveouts, the California 
doctrine has the effect of destroying economic value and should not be 
adopted by other courts. 
 
 
 229. Note that California courts might well be trying to keep employees from having to 
arbitrate whenever possible, but that this systemic hostility to arbitration is not permitted under 
the FAA. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (striking down 
California’s unconscionability rule that had the effect of nullifying class arbitration waivers). 
